ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

a statute creating a railroad commission with power to regulate freight
tariffs. Subsequently by a supplemental act the legislature confined the
operation of this statute to persons and property transported from one
place to another within the state, and to persons and freight transported
from a place without the state to a place within the state, and from a
place within the state to a place without the state.
The Illinois Central Railroad Company, was an Illinois corporation
leasing and operating the Chicago, St. Louis and New Orleans Railroad,
extending from Cairo, Illinois to New Orleans, Louisiana. This latter
corporation had been created by the legislatures of Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee and Kentucky as a continuous line, and had become the
purchaser of certain other railroad corporations. As a condition upon
which the legislature of Mississippi had granted to the Chicago, St.
Louis and New Orleans Railroad Company corporate powers, it was
required that it should pay and it did pay to the state the indebtedness
of the corporations purchased by it as aforesaid, and under said grant
of corporate powers, the said corporation was expressly given the right
previously granted to the purchased corporations, "to adopt, establish
and change at pleasure a tariff of charges." The Illinois Central Railroad filed a bill setting forth these facts, and an injunction was granted
restraining the commissioners from interfering with it in the management of its road. The opinion was delivered by Judge HILL, who bases
his decision first on the ground that the right granted to the corporation to adopt, establish and change a tariff of charges could not be interfered with without impairing the obligation of the contract, and secondly,
on the ground that even in its modified form, the statute was unconstitutional as a regulation of commerce, his views on this subject being
substantially the same as those of Judge HAMMOND above quoted.
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was contrived against them all and the same means were used to deceive
them all, will not entitle them to maintain a joint action for relief,
unless it was through a joint transaction that the fraud was accomplished : Levering v. Schnell, 78 Mo.
Non-survivalof Actionfor Personalkiurie&-Inn-keepers-Actonfor
Injury to Guest.-An action for injuries to the person does not survive
as against the executor of the wrongdoer: Stanley v. Bircher, 78 Mo.
The obligation resting upon an inn-keeper to keep his guest safe, is
one imposed by law and not growing out of contract, and for violation
of it the action is an action on the case for the injury sustained, and not
for breach of contract: Id.
AGENT.

Undisclosed Principal-Suitby.-Where a contract not under seal is
made with an agent in his own name for an undisclosed principal,
either the agent or the principal may sue upon it: .Balto. Coal Tar &
Manufacturing Co. v. Fletcher, 61 Mo.
But if the principal sues upon a contract made with an agent in the
name of the latter, the defendant is entitled to be placed in the same
position at the time of the disclosure of the principal as if the agent
had been the real contracting party : Id.
ARBITRATION.

Award- When binding-Ratification- Witness.-If an award is
broader than the submission, and either constitutes ond entirety or its
several parts are so connected as to be conditional and dependent upon
one another, it will be void; but if one part is complete in itself, and
is separable from and independent of the rest and that part is covered
by the submission, it will be upheld, while the rest will be rejected;
but even that part not within the submission will become binding if
accepted by the parties : Ellison v.' Weathers, 78 Mo.
No new consideration is necessary to uphold a subsequent ratification
of an unauthorized award: Id.
An arbitrator is not a competent witness to impeach his own award:
i'd.
BILLS AND NOTES.

Promissory Note- ContingentPromise-Ne'gotiabilit.-A promissory
note bore upon its face a statement that it was issued as collateral to the
makers' draft accepted by a third party. In an action against the
indorsers of this note in their character of indorsers: Held, that the
undertaking of the makers was a contingent one; that the amount due
on the note at its maturity was uncertain; that the note was not negotiable, and that the indorsers, as indorsers, were not liable: American
National Bank v. Sprague, 14 R. I.
* Promissory Note-Resevation of right to pay in instalments-Negotiabilit.-The reservation in a prom'issory note of the "right to pay
this note before maturity in instalments of not less than five per cent.
of the principal thereof at any time the semi-annual interest becomes
payable," does not render the note uncertain as to amount or time of
payment, and does not prevent the note being negotiable: Riker v.
Sprague Mfg. Co., 14 R. I.
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If the time of payment named in the note must certainly come,
although the precise day may not be specified therein, it is sufficiently
certain as to time to be negotiable: Id.
The indorsers of a promissory note formally and generally waived in
writing demand upon the maker and notice to themselves of non-payment, and filed this waiver with the trustee and mortgagee of a mortgage deed securing the note. Subsequently, in an action against the
indorsers, the plaintiffs holders of the unpaid note set out in their
declaration this waiver, which had never been revoked: ield, that the
plaintiffs were entitled to recover without offering proof of protest of
the note: Id.
See Negligence.
COMMI2ION CARRIER.
Action against, for" Goods destroyed by Fire, where there was an
Isst,ance which has been paid-leasure of Damages.-An insurance
company having paid the loss suffered by the insured in consequence
of a fire for which a common carrier was also answerable to him, may sue
the carrier in his name to its use, and the measure of damages is the
full value of the goods destroyed. The right of the insurance company
is worked out through the rights of the insured : if only part of the loss
has been paid by the insurer, the insured is entitled to the residue, and
the carrier cannot set up the insurer's payment of his part of the loss as
a partial satisfaction : Mobile & Montgomery RailroadCo. v. Jure, S.
(. U. S., Oct..Term 1883.
See ConstitutionalLaw; Contract;
Parent and Child.
Right of State Court to issue habeas corpusfor and discharge Prisoner
confined in violation of Constitution and Laws of the Vnited States.Subject to the exclusive and paramount authority of the national
-government, by its own judicial tribunals, to determine whether persons held in custody by authority of the courtsoDf the United States,
or by commissioners of such courts, or by officers of the general
government acting under its -laws, are so held in conformity with
law, the states have the right, by their own courts, or by the
judges thereof, to inquire 'into the grounds upon which any person,
within their respective territorial limits, is restrained of his liberty, and
to discharge him, if it be ascertained that such restraint is illegal, and
this, notwithstanding such illegality may arise from a violation of the
constitution and laws of the United States: Robb v. Connolly, S. C. U.
S., Oct. Term 1883.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Statute forbidding non-residents to catch Fish-Enforcement, in
another State, of Contract in violation of.-The statute of the State of
Virginia, Code of 1873, cap. 100, see. 4, which forbids non-residents to
catch fish for the manufacture of manure and oil, and to manufacture
manure and oil from fish caught within the waters of that State, is not
in violation of Article IV. see. 2, of the constitution of the United
States: Chambers v. Church, 14 R. L
A contract to be executed wholly in Virginia in violation of this
statute will not be enfbrced in Rhode Island. Nor can a bill in equity
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be sustained in Rhode Island for an account of profits of such a contract which has been executed : Id.
Provisionfor' Cumulative Votivg- When not Retroactive-Impairing
Charter of Corporation.-The intent to give a retrospective operation
to a law must be clearly expressed in order that it may receive such a
construction; and this is equally as true of constitutional provisions as
of statutes. So, where a legislative charter provided that directors of
the corporation should be elected by vote of stockholders, allowing one
vote for every share, and also provided that the legislature should have
no power to alter, suspend or repeal the charter, and subsequently a
constitutional provision was adopted providing in general terms for
cumulative voting at all elections of corporation directors; Held, that
as there was nothing in this provision specially applicable to the corporation in question, and as there were other corporations in existence
when the constitution was adopted to which it could apply, in addition
to those which might thereafter be incorporated, it would be held not
to operate upon this particular corporation : State v. Greer, 78 11o.
The right of corporators to vote at elections for directors, is a property right, and if the mode of voting is prescribed by an irrepealable
charter, it is protected by that provision of the constitution of the United
States which prohibits the states from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts, so that the State cannot interfere with it either by,
constitutional or legislative enactment : 1d.
CONTRACT.

StockBroing Contracts-Dealing on Margins-Not enforceable,
although valid in State where made.-Contracts for speculations in
stocks upon margins, when the broker and the customer do not contemplate or intend that the stock purchased or sold shall become or be
treated as the stock of the customer, but the real transaction Is a mere
dealing in the difference between prices-that is, in -the payment of
future profits or losses, as the event may be-are contracts of wager,
dependent on a chance or casualty. Such contracts, if made in this
State, are .unlawful, and securities given therefor are void by force of
the provisions of "the act to prevent gaming :" Flagg v. Baldwin, 11
N. J. Eq.
Such contracts, though made in another state, where they are to be
presumed to be lawful and enforceable, will not be enforced here-at
least against residents and citizens of this State-because their enforcement would violate the plain public policy of this State on the subject
of gambling and betting evinced by the statute above mentioned. In
this respect, such contracts are excepted from the rule of comity which
requires the enforcement by the courts of one state of contracts made in
another, if valid by the lez loci contractus : Id.
CORPORATION.

See ConstitutionalLaw.

COSTS.
.Exceptions to Master's Report.-A party who succeeds in a substantial particular, on exceptions to a master's report, is, as a general rule,
entitled to his costs in such proceeding : Sanford v. Clarke, 11 N. J. Eq.
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DE1BTOR AND CREDITOR.

DECEDENTS' ESTATES.
EQUITY.

See Equity.
See Will.

See Costs.

Bill l4y Creditor to Subject Debtor's Chose !n action to Payment of
Debt- When not .afointainable.-A judgment creditor in the absence
of fraud, trust or other'ground for equitable relief, and when no statute
gives equitable jurisdiction, cannot by proceedings in equity subject a
chose in action of his debtor to the payment of his judgment: G-reen v.
Keene, 14 R. 1.
Hence, when a judgment debtor owned letters patent and arranged
with third parties to do business under these letters and to pay to his
wife the profits due him under the arrangement; there being no fraud
on the part of these third parties, and the payments to the wife being
in accordance with a direction given by the judgnient debtor, and revocable at his pleasure : Iled, on demurrer to a bill in equity filed by the
judgment creditor for an account of these profits and for the application of them to the judgment debt, there being no statute authorizing
the intervention of equity, that the bill could not be sustained : _d.
Trade .lark2- When not Protected-.AMisrepresetation.-Acourt of
equity will not interpose by injunction to protect a claim to a trade-mark
or label wher6 either contains a misrepresentation : Siegert v. Abbott,
61 Nid.
The complainants claiming to be the manufacturers and exclusive
proprietors of certain cordial or aromatic bitters, popularly known as
"Angostura Bitters ;" and claiming as its trade-mark this designation,
sought to enjoin the defendants, who were engaged in the manufacture
of an article styled "Angostura Aromatic Bitters," from manufacturing
or selling any preparation or article under the name of" Angostura
Bitters," and from imitating the complainants' labels in which the bottles containing their bitters were wrapped. The labels of the complainants used when their bill was filed, stated that the bitters is prepared
by Dr. S.-that it was prepared at Angostura, but is now prepared at
Port of Spain. Dr. S. died some years before the bill was filed by his
successors in the business, and he never lived at Port of Spain. The
label also stated that the bottles bore the signature of the complainants,
when in faet they bore the signature of the original inventor. ield,
That the complainants in consequence of the misrepresentations contained in their label were not entitled to relief against the defendants
Id.
EVIDENCE. See Insurance.
ExFCUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
Purchase at Sale to pay Debts-Invalidity of.-Executors charged
with the sale of lands to pay debts, purchasing such lands at a sheriff's
sale under execution against testator, will at the instance of cestuis que
trust, be decreed to hold such lands by a continuing trust, or held to
account for the proceeds if the same have been resold to bonafide purchasers: Marshall v. C£arson, 11 N. J. Eq.
The interest of such persons as purchasers in their own right is in
VOL. X..XIL-61
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conflict with the duty which, in their fiduciary character they owe to
creditors and beneficiaries under the will : Id.
No trustee can directly or indirectly become a purchaser, in his own
behalf, of the trust property, and hold it against the cestui q'ue trust: Id.
Deposit of Estate -inds in Bank.-An executor who deposits money
to his credit, in his official capacity, in a bank of good standing, will not
be liable for its loss by the failure of such bank: Cox v. Roome, 11
N. J. Eq.
Letters- Who entitled to.-Letters of administration should be granted
to the person entitled to the same .at the time of the application therefor; and not to the person entitled at the time of the death of the
intestate : G'ffith v. Coleman, 61 Md.
I G. at the time of her death left five children, one son and four
married danghters. After a litigation of some six years it was finally
determined that G. died intestate. Pending the litigation, the son and
one of the daughters of G. died, as also the husband of another daughter:
Held, that the unmarried daughter,was entitled to letters of administration upon the estate of the intestate : Id.
INJUNCTION.
INSANITY.

See Equity.

See Insurance.

See Common Carrier.
Opinions of Persons not Exprts admissible on question of Insanity.Upon an issue in a suit upon a life policy as to the insanity of the
insured at the time he took his own life, the opinion of a non-professional
witness as to his mental condition, in connection with a statement of the
fl cts and circumstances within his personal knowledge upon which that
opinion is based, is competent evidence: Connecticut Atut. 4Wfe Ins.
Co. v. Lathrop, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1883.
INSURANCE.

LIFE TENANT.

Prncipal and Income-Stock Dividend.-New shares of capital
stock in a corporation representing its surplus property and distributed
to its stockholders are not to be considered as, income and do not belong
to a life tenant: Petition of Samuel D. Brown, 14 R. I.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OP.

Cumulation of Disabilities.-Theperiod of coverture cannot be added
to that of minority of the same person in order to prevent the running
of the Statute of Limitations: Farishv. Cook, 78 Mo.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

Power to create Board of Iealth.-Under the power to preserve the
health and safety of the inhabitants, a municipal corporation has the
undoubted right to pass ordinances creating Boards of Health, appointing Health Commissioners with other subordinate officials, regulating
the removal of house dirt, night soil, refuse, offal and filth, by persons
licensed to perform such work, and providing for the prohibition, abatement and suppression of whatever is intrinsically and inevitably a
nuisance : Boehm v. The .Mayor and Cty Council of Baltimore, 61 Md.
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Powers j/: in this (ounty analogous to those of similar Bodies in
L'ngland.-Powcer to issue Commercial Paper.-All or nearly all of the
States of the Union being divided into political districts similar to those
of the country from which our laws and institutions arc, in great part,
derived, having the same general purposes and powers of local government and administration ; in the absence of local state statutes or decisions to the contrary, their general powers are to be interpreted in
accordance with the analogy furnished by their prototypes, varied and
nmodified, of course, by the changed conditions and circumstances which
arise from our peculiar form of government, our social state and plysical surroundings : Claiborne County v. Brooks, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term,
1883.
The power to issue negotiable paper is expressly foreign to the purposes of the creation of counties and townships, and is never to be conceded except by express legislation, or by necessary or, at least, very
strong implication from such legislation : .1d.
Police Regulations-Power to declare and abaie MNisances-LimeKilns.-Whatever power can be properly exercised by the municipal
authorities of the city of Baltimore over the rights and property of the
citizen, under the denomination of police regulations, must be derived
from the Legislature of the State, by express grant or by fair and reasonable intendment: State of .Afarland v. Mott, 61 Md.
Within the power granted, the degree of necessity or propriety of its
exercise rests exclusively with the proper corporate authorities ; but in
all cases the power exercised, or attempted to be exercised, must
depend upon the nature and extent of the power granted; and whenever the question of the existence or limit of power is raised, it becomes
the plain duty of the courts to see that the corporate authorities do not
transcend the authority delegated to them : Id.
A particular use of property declared a nuisance by an ordinance
of a municipal corporation, does not make such use a nuisance, unless it
be so in fact, according to the common-law or statutory definition of a
nuisance : V.
Where a city charter only confers the authority to "prevent and remove
nuisances;" the mere possibility that all the lime-kilus withip the
limits of the city may, in the future, become nuisances, does not justify
the city in prohibiting the business entirely in anticipation: Id.
The burning of lime is not an unlawful business or trade, and is not a
nuisance in its nature per se, irrespective of the location, and lime-kilns
not being nuisances in their nature, irrespective of their local surroundings, there is no authority in the Mayor and City Council to make them
nuisances, either to health, comfort, or property, by simply declaring
them so : Id.
NATIONAL BANK.
Lialility of Pledgee of Stock held in the name of an i4'responsiblc
Clecek.-A corporation received stock as collateral security, the
certificate of which was originally made out in the namine of the
president, as such ; by direction of the corporation the stock was within a
few days transterred to an irresponsible employee, who executed an
irrevocable power of attorney in blank, and the certificate was so held
by the company for some years. -Neither the compaamy nor the person
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in whose name the stock stood collected any dividends thereon, or exercised any act of ownership over it.. This plan was adopted to avoid
incurring any liability on the part of the pledgees as shareholders, and
the bank at the time of the transfer was in a prosperous condition, but
failed several years afterward. Held, that the pledgee was not liable as
a shareholder; Anderson v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term, 1883.
NEGLIGENCE.

Fire Escapes-Act providingfor-No action to IndividuaZ for neglect
to provide.-A local act of the legislature affecting the city of Providence provided that " every building already built or hereafter to be
erected in which twenty-five or more operatives are employed in any of
the stories above the second story, shall be provided with proper and
sufficient, strong and durable, metallic fire escapes, or stairways, constructed as required by this act, unless exempted therefrom by the
inspector of buildings, which shall be kept in good repair by the owner
of such building, and no person shall at any time place any incumbrance
upon any such fire escapes." Other sections of the act provided remedies as follows : ,"Any person violating any provision of this act wherein,
no penalty is herein otherwise prescribed shall be fined twenty dollars
for every violation thereof, and shall be fined not exceeding twenty dollars for each day's continuance of the said violation after the service of
the warrant issued upon the first complaint. The Supreme Court in term
time or any justice thereof in vacation may restrain by injunction any
violation of this act, and may, according to the course of equity, secure
the fulfilment and execution of the provisions thereof." The chief
engineer of the fire department was charged with executing the provisions of the act. Held, that the scheme of the act was to secure safe
structures as a police measure and for the general safety. Beld, fiurthe, that it was not the scheme of the act to create any duty which
could be made the subject of an action by individuals, and that no
remedy in favor of individuals beyond what is expressly given in the
act should be implied for mere neglect to perform the duties created by
the act: Grant v. The Slater Mill and Power Co., 14 R. I.
Hence when one employed as an operative in a building subject to
the act was compelled by a fire to jump from an upper window and
thereby suffered injuries, there being no fire escape on the building,
and brought trespass on the case against the owner of the building to
recover damages for his injuries, alleging the owner's violation of the
duties imposed by the act, Held, on demurrer to the declaration that
the action could not be maintained: Id.
Aldrich v. Howard, 7 R. I. 199, distinguished: Id.
Couch v. Steel, 3 El. & B. 402, discussed: Id.
When Questionfor Jury.-In an action against a railroad company
by a passenger to recover for injuries sustained, the plaintiff's evidence
must ,be assumed to be true, in considering the question whether there
was sufficient legal evidence to sustain a recovery: The Western Maryland Railroad Co. v. Stanley, 61 Md.
In passing through a long tunnel lights are necessary, and the windows, doors and ventilators should be closed. But it does not follow
that an officer should be provided for every car, or that the omission t,
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shut out the gas and smoke, would, of itself, give the right to passengers
to sue for tie discomfort and annoyance : Id.
A passenger sitting close to the front door of a crowded car, when
passing through a tunnel, attempted to shut the door while the car was
in total darkness, in order to keep out the smoke and cinders, and in
doing so was injured.
In an action for damages brought by him
against the railroad company it was held: 1st. That all the facts and
circumstances taken together would warrant the finding of negligence
on the part of the deindant, and justify a verdict for the plaintiff,
unless the plaintiff's conduct amounted to contributory negligence. 2d.
That the court below properly refused to instruct the jury that the
plaintiff was chargeable with contributory negligence: Id.
PARENT AND CHILD.

Father entitled to Oustody.-A father is entitled to the custody of his
infant child unless the interests of the child forbid it: Petitionof herman G. retterlein, 14 R. I.
In habeas corpus brought by a father for the custody of an infant
child to which the mother made return showing a decree of divorce
granted in 1877 on her petition, in the state of Indiana, and giving
her custody of the child : Query, whether the decree, so far as it affected
the custody of the child, had any force outside of the jurisdiction
wherein it was made: Id.
But it appearing that the proceedings for divorce were irregular and
void, that the child had for eight years been kept under its mother's
influence, and in ignorance of its father, and that its nurture and education would be as well cared for by the father as by the mother. Hfeld,
that the father should have the custody of the child, the mother to have
access to it at all reasonable times : Rd.
PARTNERSHIP.

See Action.

Will.

Liability of one holding iEnself out as a Partner.-A person who is
not a partner cannot be held liable by reason of having held himself out
as such, by one who had no knowledge or belief of and consequently
could have done nothing of the faith of such holding out. There may
be cases in which the holding out has been so public and so long continued that the jury may infer that one dealing with the partnership
knew it and relied upon it, without direct testimony to that effect. The
nature and amount of evidence requisite to satisfy the jury may vary
according to circumstances, but the rule of law is always the same
Tiompson v. First Arat. Bank of Toledo, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1883.
Non-trading Partnerships.-Powerof Members to execute Notes.Ordinarily. partners in a non-trading firm have no implied power to
bind each other by commercial paper executed in the name of the firm.
To make such paper binding, it must be shown either that the making
of it was consented to in advance or subsequently ratified by the other
partners, or else that from the constitution and particular purposes of
the firm the power is necessary or usually exercised; Deardoif v.
Thatcher, 78 Mo.
This rule applied to a firm engaged in the insurance, real estate and
collecting business: Id.
Ilickmqn v. Kunkle, 27 Mo. 401, overruled: Id.
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See Eguity.

PATENT.
RAILROAD.

See .Neyligence.

RECEIVER.
Suit for Torts committed by Corporation.-An action may be maintained against the receiver of a corporation for a tort committed by the
corporation before his appointment. The judgment, if for the plaintiff,
will be against him in his capacity as receiver, and is leviable out of
the assets in his hands: Combs v. Smith, 78 Mo.
STATUTE.

See Negligence.

TRADE-MARK.

See Equit/.

TRUST.

'ndefinteness-QCypres dotrine.-A testamentary gift for purposes both
public and benevolent, when the will shows it to have been inspired by
philanthropy and aimed at permanent good, is a charitable gift: ell v.
Mercer, 14 R.I.
A bequest of personalty in trust for such works of religion or benevolence as the executors of the will may select is a good gift to charitable
uses, when it appears from the will that benevolence is used in the legal
sense of charity: Id.
The law of charitable uses as administered by English chancery in its
regular jurisdiction is a part of the law of Rhode Island : Id.
The Supreme Court having full chancery powers by statute has so
much of the cypres power as is exercised by English chancery without
recourse to the prerogative powers delegated to it in particular cases by
the sign manual of the crown: Id.
UNITED STATES.

What wearing Apparel is exempt from Duty.-A citizen of the United
States arriving home from a visit to Europe, with his family, in the end
of September, by a vessel, brought with him wearing apparel, bought
there for his and their use, to be worn here during the season then approaching, "not excessive in quantity for persons of their means, habits
and station in life," and their ordinary outfit for the winter. A part of
the articles had not been worn, and duties were exacted by the collector
on all those articles. Held, that, under sect. 2505 of the Rev. Stat., now
sect. 2503, by virtue of sect. 6 of the Act of March .3d 1883, c. 121
(22 St. 521), exempting from duty "wearing apparel in actual use, and
other p~rsonal effects (not merchandise) * * * of persons arriving in
the United States," the proper rule to be applied was to exempt from
duty such of the articles as fulfilled the following conditions : (1) Wearing
apparel owned by the passenger, and in a condition to be worn at once
without further manufacture; (2) brought with him as a passenger, and intended for the use or wear of himself or his family who accompanied him
as passengers, and not for sale, or purchased or imported for other persons,
or. to be given away; (3) suitable for the season of the year which was
immediately approaching at the time of arrival; (4) not exceeding in
quantity or quality or value what the passenger was in the habit of ordinarily providing for himself and his family at that time, and keeping on

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

hand for his and their reasonable wants in view of their means and
habits in life, even though such articles had not been actually worn
Astor v. Merritt, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1883.
UNITED STATES COURTS.
Proport7/ taken in Execution by a United States .ilarshal cannot be

rcp,.vied ;n the State Court.-Where property has been levied upon
by tie United States Marshal under an execution upon a judgment
obtained in the United States Court, his possession of the property thus
obtained is a complete defence to an action of replevin brought against
him therefbr in the state court, without regard -to the rightful ownership : Cvell v. ITerynan, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1883.
If property of a third person is thus levied upon he must seek his
redress i/p the United States Court: 1ld.
Usmy. See Interest.
T'hen nwt applicable to Discharge of -PrincpalDebt.-A statute
pre cribing a legal rate of interest, and forbidding the taking of a higher
rate -under pain of forfeiture of the entire interest so contracted," and
that " if any person hereafter shall pay on any contract a higher rate
of interest than the above, as discount dr otherwise, the same may be
sued for, and recovered within twelve months of the time of such payment," confers no authority to apply usurious interest actually paid to
the discharge of the principal debt. A suit for recovery within twelve
months after payment is the exclusive remedy : Walsh v. .layer, S. C.
U. S., Oct. Term 1883.
WILL.
Constructio-Remainder- Time of Vesting.-In the absence of plain
expressions, or an intent plainly inferrible from the terms of the will,
the earliest time for the vesting of property will be adopted, where there
is more than one period mentioned in the will: Crisp, &c., v. Crisp,
61 Md.
A testator by his will gave his farm in A. county to his wife and
brother in trust, for his wife A. E. C., to use and enjoy said farm
and premises, and receive the income therefrom " until such time as
they shall have an offer of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000),
and shall invest fifty thousand dollars of the proceeds of such sale in
good and safe securities under the direction of the court, and pay the
interest received from the said fifty thousand dollars so invested unto
my wife A. B. C. during her natural life, and at her death said fifty
thousand dollars, or the securities in which the same may be invested,
shall go to and become the property and estate of such person or persons
as would, by the now existing laws of the State of Maryland, be entitled
to take an estate in fee simple in lands by descent from me, and the
heirs, executors and administrators of such person or persons per stirpes,
and not per capita." flehl, that the remnaminder in said fifty thousand
dollars vested in the persons who were the heirs of the testator at the
time of his death : Id.
Dh'ection to continue Business--Powvor of Eaectors-Individual
Assets used by Firns.-The testator (P. B.), by his will, authorized and
empowered his executors to continue his interest in the firms of "P.
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Ballantine & Sons" and " Ballantine & Company," and to form said firms
into a joint stock company, or companies; to receive and hold sto&k in
the same, in the place and stead of his interest or interests therein, for
the benefit of his estate, &c. On bill filed for construction of the will,
Held, that the executors were authorized to continue in the business of
the firms all the property of the testator embarked therein at the time
of his decease, including real estate owned by him individually and as a
partner, and that held in trust by him for the firm; Ballantine v. Frelinghuysen, 11 N. J.
That the executors have power to act in forming a corporation, and to
convey thereto the testator's interest in the firms, which includes the
above-named real estate; and to receive stock in proportion to his interest: Id.
That in making such conveyance .and appraisement, lands and buildiugs owned by him individually, but used by the firms in conducting
their business so that they cannot be separated, for which rent was
allowed, shall be valued at their fair present value, not as partnership,
but individual property: Id.
That lands owndd by him which have been built upon and appropriated by the firms so that they cannot be separated in use from buildings
on the lands of the firms, will be likewise valued as his, as of the time
of appropriation: Id.
.That lands conveyed to the testator, paid for out of partnership funds
and bought for the purpose of being used in the partnership business,
in equity are held in trust, and form part of the joint estate of the partnership : Id.
Undue Influence-Presumptionof -Where a mother, mentally enfeebled by reason of disease, and in a position where one of her two
sons could exercise an improper influence over her, made a will leaving
nearly all her property to this son, the burden is upon him to show that
such instrument was executed without the exercise of undue influence
by him; Dale v. Dale, 11 N. J. Eq.
Proof of Execution-Witnesses.-The evidence offered in support of
a paper propounded as a will showed that it was written in a language
not understood by the supposed testatrix; that the witnesses attested
not at her request, but at the request of one of the legatees; and that
she neither said nor did anything, nor was anything said or done in her
presence which indicated that she knew she was making a will. Held,
that the execution of the paper as a will was not proven; Miltenberger
v. Miltenberg r, 78 Mo.
A legatee whose interest as such in the establishment of a will still
continues, will not be allowed to testify to its due execution, notwithstanding he may not have signed as an attesting witness. The statute
only disqualifies him in express terms in the case in which he has so
signed, but it would defeat the manifest policy of the statute to allow
him to testify when he has not so signed. Id.

